




## **MHF and HF Alkylation Unit Dangers Are Equivalent**

*AQMD Proposed Rule 1410 Working Group Meeting #3*

*Dr. S. Hayati and the TRAA Science Advisory Panel June 15, 2017*



# HYDROFLUORIC ACID (HF) GOLDFISH RELEASE TESTS

*-Nevada Desert 1986-*


**100% released HF formed ground-hugging 80% aerosol 20% vapor cloud**

**8,300 pounds HF were released  
2 miles from the release spot, the HF cloud was  
4 times the potentially lethal concentration**

**Torrance's 2 settlers w/ 50,000 lb. MHF each were nearly struck 2/18/2015  
84% mitigation of a 50,000 lb. release would leave 8300 lb. airborne MHF**

# MHF EVALUATED: DESPITE “TRADE SECRET” RIGHTS


MHF solution by weight: HF 90 wt% + Sulfolane (additive) 10 wt% **MAX**  
by molecule count: HF 98.4 mol% + Sulfolane (additive) 1.6 mol% **MAX**



*George Harpole, Ph.D., Chief Engineer at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems in Redondo Beach.*


1. "HF and MHF – Equivalent Ground Hugging Fog Hazards." <<http://bit.ly/2qoAfP0>>.
2. "Flash Atomization of HF and MHF," <<http://bit.ly/2jqBiGK>>.
3. "Flash Atomization of MHF" <<http://bit.ly/2pEt9FE>>.

# MHF AND HF ARE EQUIVALENT HAZARDS




MHF  
**73°F**

*Boiling  
Point*



MHF  
**90°F**  
100 psi  
*Flash  
Atomization  
100% airborne*



MHF  
**95°F**  
100 psi  
*Aerosol is fine  
enough to flow  
around barriers*

*Mobil's MHF & barrier ARF estimates are invalid for many reasons. Most significantly, with **10 wt% Sulfolane**, MHF's critical superheat point is within alkyl unit parameters.*

# MISLEADING ARGUMENTS FOR MHF SAFETY CONTINUE


## (1) Industry claims MHF is 80% HF, not 98.2% HF

Industry won't concede (molecule) mole percent (mol%) is most relevant to vapor pressure

Component	CAS-No.	Weight %	Mole %
Hydrogen fluoride	7664-39-3	90.00%	98.2%
Sulfolane	126-33-0	10.00%	1.8%

Honeywell MHF SDS  
<http://bit.ly/21T6yAt>

Industry conflates MHF w/ the contents of alky unit




**Alky unit contents: 80% HF, 7% additive, 3% H<sub>2</sub>O, 3% ASO, 7% other HC that are not soluble**

- Note: 80% HF is at lowest edge of viable alkylation, near acid runaway
- 93.5 wt% of the *solution* is MHF, which is 8 wt% additive + 92 wt% HF  
Or by molecule count, 1.4 mol% additive + 98.6 mol% HF
- Hydrocarbons + H<sub>2</sub>O (contaminant) + ASO (byproduct) can't stop HF or MHF flashing

# MISLEADING ARGUMENTS FOR MHF SAFETY CONTINUE


(2) Industry claims H bonds with additive & water **prevent** MHF flash atomization

- **MHF Hydrogen bonds already accounted for in TRAA's MHF assessment**
- Raoult's Law ideal solns: vapor pressure (VP)  $\propto$  mol%, 10 wt% **MHF VP = 98% HF VP**
- But MHF has H bonding, an attractive force,  $\therefore$  MHF is not an "ideal solution"
- That's why we used this graph of MHF VP vs additive wt%, which reflects H bonding
- 1 sulfolane molecule can't form H bonds with 60-70 HF molecules
- Parameters  $\uparrow$ : boiling pt, critical superheat
- MHF 10 wt%  $\rightarrow$  6°F higher than for HF
- MHF 8 wt%  $\rightarrow$  **5°F** higher than pure HF (soln)
- **H bonds from 3.2 wt% water, 3% ASO (soln)**
- VP 11%  $\downarrow$  H<sub>2</sub>O/MHF VP  $\approx$  79% HF VP, extra 5°F
- ASO effect is less than water, extra 1°F
- H<sub>2</sub>O/ASO: parameters **6°F**  $\uparrow$  than MHF




MHF/H<sub>2</sub>O/ASO: parameters **11°F**  $\uparrow$  than pure HF

# MHF AND HF ARE EQUIVALENT HAZARDS




MHF  
**78°F**

*Boiling  
Point*



MHF  
**95°F**  
100 psi

*Flash  
Atomization  
100% airborne*



MHF  
**100°F**  
100 psi

*Aerosol is fine  
enough to flow  
around barriers*

*Mobil's MHF & barrier ARF estimates are invalid for many reasons. Most significantly, 8 wt% Sulfolane, 3.5% H<sub>2</sub>O, 3% ASO, MHF's critical superheat point w/in unit params*



# MISLEADING ARGUMENTS FOR MHF SAFETY CONTINUE

(3) Industry claims pressure & temp can be flexibly manipulated to increase ARF

PRESSURE & TEMP: SET BY  
PROCESSING PARAMETERS  
OF ALKYLATION UNIT  
TOO LITTLE VARIABILITY  
TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE

How Does ARF Protect Me	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MHF (1994) Original Additive Concentration</li> </ul>	MHF + Pressure + Temp = 65% ARF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MHF (1998) Revised Additive Concentration (unbarriered)</li> </ul>	8 wt% additive MHF + Pressure + Temp = 50% ARF
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MHF (1998) Revised Additive Concentration with Barriers</li> </ul>	MHF + Pressure + Temp = 89% ARF

*Torrance Public Workshop, Quarterly Refinery Update, 2017-02-28. <http://bit.ly/2rplhVF>*

1999: Consent Decree Safety Advisor S. Maher, “Evaluation of MHF Alky Catalyst”

- **Unit pressure has no measurable effect** [on ARF] over operating range of Alky Unit.
- **ARF varies little with temperature change** between MHF’s boiling & flash points

“There are no data on the value of the critical superheat for MHF.”

Consent Decree Safety Advisor 1995 Report




# MISLEADING ARGUMENTS FOR MHF SAFETY CONTINUE


## (4) 8 wt% sulfolane delivers 50% ARF

Original MHF developers data, testing done early 90s

HF/Additive Tests				Pressure: 140 psig
Additive wt %	Temperature °F.	Impact Plate & Pad Yes/No	Rainout wt %	
50	110	N	64	
50	110	Y	99	
34	90	N	53	



1999 SA report graph, redacted



Post MHF 1997 unit failure: a little (additive) goes a long way

- 8% sulfolane credited with 50% ARF at --/--. 100°F/100 psig std alky unit

Original R&D: preferred MHF composition 20–40% additive.<sup>2</sup> ARF ↓ if add wt% < 30%.

- 10% sulfolane extrapolated to 18% ARF at 86°F/-- psig (not tested)<sup>2,3</sup>
- 20% sulfolane credited with 32% ARF at 90°F/50 psig. Described as “fuming”<sup>2</sup>
- 34% sulfolane credited with 53% ARF at 90°F/140 psig<sup>1, 4</sup> Described as liquid<sup>2</sup>


[1] Mobil, Containment of an Aerosolable liquid jet, US5286456, 1992. <<http://bit.ly/2lmsmnx>>.

[2] Phillips, Alky catalyst containing hydrofluoric acid & a sulfone, 1992, <<http://bit.ly/2hPLiNr>>.

[3] Phillips, Isoparaffin-olefin alkylation, US5534657, 1995, <<http://bit.ly/2iWPonl>>. Fig. 7

[4] Mobil, Containment of an Aerosolable liquid jet, 1992, <<http://bit.ly/2lmsmnx>>.

MHF risk  $\approx$  HF risk  
~16 mi toxic distance  
Typical of HF units



# HF ALKYLATION: REJECTED YEARS AGO IN SO CA

## 1990 Torrance-Mobil Consent Decree

- MHF would not form aerosol or dense vapor cloud upon release

## 1991 AQMD Rule 1410

- MHF release would not result in atmospheric concentrations  $\geq 20$  ppm for 5 min & 120 ppm for one min at or outside facility boundary

## 2003 SCAQMD Environmental Justice MOU


- Termination of storage and use of concentrated HF



LOWBALL OFFICIAL EPA MHF RMP WCSs show a dense vapor cloud forms & HF  $\geq 20$  ppm exist for miles around each refinery. ~1M people.

**IF NOT FOR FALSE CLAIMS RE: MHF & H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub>, HF WOULD'VE BEEN GONE YEARS AGO.**

# DENY MHF FLASHING; INVENT $H_2SO_4$ FLASHING



2008: Safety Advisor Maher hired by Big West Refinery to sell Bakersfield on MHF by claiming a 10-mile toxic distance for an  $H_2SO_4$  alkylation unit vs 6.5-mi for MHF. Mobil & its hand picked Safety Advisor did the same under Consent Decree in '94. This rural area decided MHF was too dangerous and rejected the permit.

# MHF FAILURE AS ALKYLATION CATALYST WAS PREDICTABLE & PREDICTED

- HF strength must be kept above 88% by weight [in the alky unit] to prevent undesired reaction products<sup>1</sup>
- [MHF] additives... reduce the catalytic performance of HF for alkylation<sup>1</sup>
- Components that reduce acid strength are water, acid soluble oil (ASO), dissolved reactants, organic fluorides,<sup>2</sup> and MHF additive
- Alky unit operation below 80% HF strength can result in an acid runaway in which the entire acid inventory converts to ASO and organic fluorides<sup>2</sup>
- Acid acts as a catalyst in a refinery alky reaction, and requires a minimal amount to enable the reaction to occur. As acid strength declines, undesirable side reactions occur, and can cascade on itself in a “runaway” manner that consumes all of the acid in the unit<sup>3</sup>
- If there is a build up of ASO by- product and HF acid is consumed (thereby reducing acid strength), the process can fail, with the resulting rapid consumption of the remaining acid – a so-called acid runaway event. Such an event is extremely costly<sup>4</sup>


1. SCAQMD, Rule 1410, Resolution #90, April 1991, <<http://bit.ly/2p0Wwla>>.

2. Effect of Operating Conditions on Corrosion in HF Alkylation Units, Johnathan Dobis, Inspectioneering, <<http://bit.ly/2rLKD1I>>.

3. Refinery Alkylation Basics, <[http://www.refinerlink.com/blog/liquid\\_gold\\_black\\_box](http://www.refinerlink.com/blog/liquid_gold_black_box)>.

4. HF Alkylation, <[https://library.e.abb.com/public/1b9c3c80511554ef8325734b004198cf/22-26%203M774\\_ENG72dpi.pdf](https://library.e.abb.com/public/1b9c3c80511554ef8325734b004198cf/22-26%203M774_ENG72dpi.pdf)>.

# MHF: NOTHING BUT FAILURES & BROKEN PROMISES



MHF unit was dangerously unstable upon startup at end of '97 at just 19% additive. Unit filled w/ polymer gunk & produced small quantities of lousy alkylate.

*The public was never told*

The "safety conferring" additive was secretly slashed again.

*The public was never told*

2<sup>nd</sup> proprietary "safety technology," physical barriers, added to "cover up" missing additive

*The public was never told*